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Are 'unbiased' forecasts really unbiased?  






This paper reconciles contradictory findings obtained from forecast evaluations: the existence of 
systematic errors and the failure to reject rationality in the presence of such errors.  Systematic 
errors in one economic state may offset the opposite types of errors in the other state such that 
the null of rationality is not rejected. A modified test applied to the Fed forecasts shows that the 
forecasts were ex post biased.   
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Are 'unbiased' forecasts really unbiased? 
Another look at the Fed forecasts 
 
 
  Monetary policy decisions are based on forecasts of future economic activity. It is for this 
reason that economists have evaluated the forecasts made by the staff of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System in preparation for the Open Market Committee meetings. The 
forecasts are quarterly predictions made several times each quarter with horizons of one to eight 
periods. The staff predicts GDP, its components, various price indices, unemployment, etc.   
Previous evaluations have primarily focused on the predictions of real and nominal GDP 
growth rates, inflation rates and the unemployment rate. The studies of Karamouzis and Lombra 
(1989), Scotese (1994), and Jansen and Kishan (1996, 1999) yielded mixed results about the 
rationality of these forecasts.  Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) found that the Fed’s 
forecasts did not reject rationality and that they were as good as the predictions made by the 
private sector. On the other hand, while Joutz and Stekler (2000) found that the forecasts were 
unbiased, there was evidence of inefficiency, and, more importantly, the Fed staff made 
systematic errors.
1   
This finding that the forecasts displayed systematic errors, such as reported by Joutz and 
Stekler (2000), has also been observed in the results of other forecast evaluations (See Zarnowitz 
and Braun, 1992; Fildes and Stekler, 2002). Forecasters overestimated the rate of growth during 
slowdowns and recessions and underestimated it during recoveries and booms. Similarly, 
inflation was underpredicted when it was rising and overpredicted when it was declining.   
                                                 
1 In addition, Clements et al. (2007) used a non-traditional approach to test for bias and found that the forecasts were 
biased, whereas the traditional approach had not rejected the null of no bias.  
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Particularly large errors occurred during the periods when prices were rising rapidly during the 
1970s and early 1980s.  Hanson and Whitehorn (2006) also observed these systematic errors but 
associated them with particular time periods rather than with stages of the business cycle.  
Despite these systematic errors, the null of unbiasedness or rationality is frequently not 
rejected when the forecasts are tested.  In particular, Joutz and Stekler (2000, pp. 30-31) note that, 
even though there were systematic errors, the null of unbiasedness was not rejected for any of the 
sets of forecasts of nominal or real GNP (GDP) or of the deflator made by the Federal Reserve.  
This result held for all forecast horizons. These two findings are mutually inconsistent and create 
a puzzle that we investigate. 
The inconsistency is that forecasts that are considered unbiased should not display 
systematic errors.  Since the systematic errors are observations that are clearly present and 
observable, the inconsistency must arise from the statistical methodology that is used to test for 
unbiasedness. 
This paper will, therefore, reexamine the Fed forecasts to determine whether they are 
biased or unbiased and whether or not they display systematic errors. We will also attempt to 
reconcile any discrepancies in the results that we discover.  In the next section, we present the 
data. This is followed by an analysis of the errors that are observed when applying the standard 
statistical methodology.  Given the inconsistency in the results, we modify the statistical 
procedure and show that the Fed forecasts are ex post biased.  
I. Data 
  We examine the Fed Greenbook forecasts that are made in preparation for the FOMC 
meetings. We analyze forecasts made between 1965IV and 2001IV for the current quarter and  
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one quarter ahead for three variables:  the real output growth rate (GNP from 1965IV to 
1991QIII and GDP from 1991IV on), the GNP/GDP deflator inflation rate, and the 
unemployment rate.   During the entire sample period, there is not a continuous series of 
forecasts for the longer horizons.  Whenever there are multiple forecasts in each quarter, we use 
the last one.
2  The actual data are the NIPA estimates that are released approximately 45 days 
after the quarter to which they refer.
3  All data, with the exception of the unemployment rate, are 
converted into annualized growth rates.   
II. Characteristics of the Forecast Errors 
  Figures (1a-1d,.., 3a-3d) present data for each variable: the annualized growth rate of real 
GNP/GDP, the annualized inflation rate as measured by the GNP/GDP deflator, and the 
unemployment rate.  The upper left hand graphs display the historical data used in the analysis.  
The other quadrants of these figures display, for each series: the current quarter and one quarter 
ahead forecast errors and the forecast revisions between the current and one quarter ahead 
forecasts.  
There were six recessions in this period.  The shaded areas of Figures 1 and 3 represent 
the dates of these recessions, as defined by the NBER.  In Figure 2 the shaded areas represent 
periods when the inflation rate was increasing (moving from trough to peak).  The dates for the 
periods of the inflation “cycle” were obtained from Dr. Anirvan Banerji of the Economic Cycle 
                                                 
2 We use the last forecast for each quarter because those are the ones for which the Fed had the maximum amount of 
information on which to base their current and next quarter forecasts.  If forecasts were made within the first 10 days 
of the next quarter, they are considered made in the previous quarter because there would be no new information for 
the subsequent quarter.  We also analyzed forecasts made in the middle of the quarter.  The results were similar. 
3 Use of the real time data avoids definitional and classification changes and is the most consistently available data 
set for our sample.  The terminology for these data releases varied over the sample:  Before 1974, the “final” data 
were released 45 days after the end of the quarter. Starting in 1974, releases at approximately the same time became 
known as “first revision” data (with a second revision about 75 days after the quarter). Since 1988, the “preliminary” 
data are released approximately two months after the quarter.  We obtained similar results using the 90 day releases.  
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Research Institute (ECRI). 
  The forecast errors are defined as actual minus forecast with a positive error meaning the 
variable was underpredicted.  In order to explore the role of the state of the economy, the errors 
for the entire sample were divided into periods of expansion and recession (based on the NBER 
business cycle dates) or periods when the rate of inflation was increasing or decreasing (based on 
the ECRI inflation cycle dates). The results (Table 1) show that the mean errors differed between 
the two states of the economy. Both the current and one quarter ahead forecasts underpredicted 
the real rate of growth in expansionary periods and overpredicted it during recessions.   
Consistent with those errors, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate were overestimated in 
periods of expansion and conversely during recessions.  
   For the current quarter there was no significant difference between the mean errors of the 
two periods.  For the one quarter ahead forecasts, the null that there was no significant difference 
in these mean errors was rejected for two of the three variables based on the NBER dates.  There 
was no significant difference in the mean inflation errors based on the NBER dates, but there 
was a significant difference when we used the ECRI inflation cycle dates (Table 1b), where 
inflation was underestimated when it was increasing and conversely when it was decreasing.  
These errors indicate that the Fed forecasts exhibit a systematic bias that is a function of the 
different states of the economy.   
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III. Bias Tests and Results 
 A.  Methodology 
The most frequently used test is the Mincer-Zarnowitz  (1969) regression (1).
4  
  1 , 0 ; , , 1 0 = + + = − − i e F A i t t i t t t β β    (1) 
where At and Ft,t-i are the actual and predicted values for time t.  The forecast is conditional on 
the information available at time t-i.  When i = 0, it refers to a current quarter forecast. The null 
hypothesis is that  01 01 and β β == .  A rejection of this hypothesis indicates that the forecasts 
are biased and/or inefficient.  The Wald test and the F distribution are used to test this null. 
   In applying (1) to the forecasts that have a one quarter lead, an econometric correction is 
made.  In that case, the error term of the equation theoretically follows a first order moving 
average. The Newey-West procedure was used to estimate HAC consistent standard errors in (1) 
for the one quarter ahead forecasts.  
  C. Results 
  At the 5% significance level, the null for the current quarter forecasts is only rejected for 
inflation (Table 2a). When applied to the one quarter ahead forecasts, the null is rejected for 
unemployment but not for the other variables (Table 2b). In this case, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the forecasts of real GDP growth and of inflation are unbiased. 
This poses the puzzle that we seek to reconcile: observed systematic biases based on 
Table 1, but statistical tests do not reject the null of rationality. There is an explanation for these 
conflicting findings. If, over time, the systematic under- and overestimates in the forecasts offset 
                                                 
4 Similar results with respect to the role of the state of the economy are obtained using the bias test of Holden and 
Peel (1990).  
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each other, there might not be observable bias in a series which combined these periods of 
offsetting systematic errors.  This idea is related to work by Swanson and van Dijk (2006) who 
show that the state of the economy affected the accuracy of the early releases of industrial 
production and producer price index data. 
IV. Modified Procedure  
The results suggest that the biases depended upon the state of the economy. We, therefore, 
divided our data sets accordingly, and used (2) to test whether or not the forecasts were ex post 
biased. 
 
 1 , 0 ; , 2 , 1 0 = + + + = − − i e D F A i t t t i t t t β β β  (2) 
where in the real GDP growth and unemployment rate regressions Dt is a dummy that reflects the 
state of the economy where it takes on the value 1 if the economy was in a recession as dated by 
the NBER and is zero otherwise.  In the inflation equation, the dummy takes on the value 1 from 
the trough to the peak of the inflation cycle as dated by Economic Cycle Research Institute 
(ECRI), zero otherwise.  The other variables are defined as before. The joint null hypothesis is 
that  01 2 0, 1, 0 and β ββ == = . If the coefficients associated with the dummies are not zero, the 
dummies contain information that can explain the errors, indicating an ex post bias.  
The results and probability values of the F statistic are reported in Tables 3a and 3b. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables are not significant in any of the current quarter equations 
(Table 3a). This result is consistent with our failure to find any significant systematic differences 
in the current quarter forecasts related to economic conditions (Table 1). The results are, 
however, different in the equations explaining the one quarter ahead predictions (Table 3b).  The  
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dummy is significant in all three equations with the probability values all less than 5% (using the 
ECRI dummy for inflation).  
The results in Table 3b are consistent with our expectations. In the real GDP growth 
equation, the NBER dummy coefficient is negative, suggesting that the Fed overestimated real 
GDP during recessions. In addition, the constant in that equation is positive and significant, 
showing that the Fed  forecasts underestimated real GDP during expansions.  In the inflation 
equation, the ECRI dummy coefficient is positive, indicating that the Fed underestimated 
inflation when it was increasing (moving from trough to peak in the inflation cycle).  Although 
the constant in that equation is insignificant, it is negative. This suggests that the Fed 
overestimated inflation when it was decreasing (moving from peak to trough in the inflation 
cycle).  We also obtain the expected results in the unemployment equation: the NBER dummy 
coefficient is positive.  
We undertook this analysis to reconcile two findings in previous studies that evaluated 
forecasts. These studies had found that there were systematic errors but the conventional tests 
showed that the forecasts were unbiased. By including dummy variables that referred to 
alternative states of the economy in those tests, we found that there was information that (ex post) 
explained the forecast errors.  This indicates there is no inconsistency in our forecast evaluation 
analyses: the forecasts are clearly ex post biased and exhibit systematic errors related to the state 
of the economy. 
V. An Interpretation 
  We have observed that none of the current quarter predictions display ex post bias, but 
that all of the one quarter ahead predictions do. We, therefore, examine the revisions in the  
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forecasts for the current quarter to try to explain why the bias was eliminated in the current 
quarter estimates.  The current quarter forecasts in our sample are the last ones that were made in 
each quarter. Consequently, at the end of the quarter the staff would have virtually complete 
knowledge about the state of the economy in period t-1 and considerable information about the 
current quarter. 
We, therefore, determine how knowledge about the state of the economy affected the 
revisions of the forecasts. The revision in the forecast,  1 , , − − t t t t F F , is regressed on the state of the 
economy to determine whether this knowledge affected the revision and affected the predictions 
of real growth (inflation) in period t.  We will consider both knowledge of the current quarter (Dt) 
and knowledge of the previous quarter (Dt-1). 
  t t t t t t D F F υ δ δ + + = − − 1 0 1 , ,  (3a) 
  t t t t t t D F F η θ θ + + = − − − 1 1 0 1 , ,  (3b) 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients associated with the state of the economy are all significant 
and have the expected signs. Knowing that the economy was in a recession either in the previous 
or in the current quarter,
5 the GDP forecasts for the current quarter are revised downwards and 
the unemployment prediction is revised upwards.  When inflation was increasing in the previous 
or current quarter, the forecast for the current quarter is revised upwards. The evidence indicates 
that the Fed forecasters had information about the state of the economy and used the information 
correctly because these revisions are in the right direction. Thus there is no evidence of ex ante 
bias.
                                                 
5 Although the NBER may not have yet officially called the recession, the forecasters have access to the same data 
as the members of the NBER business cycle dating committee have, so our results suggest that they know the state 
of the economy in the current quarter, but that they cannot predict it one quarter ahead.  
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VI. Implications and Conclusions 
  We have shown that it is possible to reconcile two contradictory findings: the existence of 
systematic errors and the failure to reject rationality in the presence of such errors. The data 
indicate that the systematic errors in one state of the economy offset the opposite types of errors 
in the other state.  When a Mincer-Zarnowitz type equation was used, the null was not rejected.  
This equation was then modified by introducing a dummy variable that reflected the state of the 
economy.  The application of this modified test to the forecasts of the Federal Reserve showed 
that conditional on the state of the economy the forecasts were ex post biased.  
  Our results indicate that in testing forecasts for bias and/or rationality, one can also check 
whether there are systematic offsetting errors that affect the results.  Swanson and van Dijk 
(2006) already have explored this problem in the context of data revisions. We recommend that 
studies that investigate the rationality of forecasts always consider this possibility. 
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Table 1a  
Greenbook Forecast Errors, 1965IV-2001IV 
NBER State of the Economy 
Variable Expansion  Recession 
   Mean  Std Error  Obs Mean  Std Error  Obs 
Value of t-stat: 
Difference of 
means test 
Current Quarter              
RealGrowth  0.260 1.209 118 -0.097 1.086 27  1.51 
INF  -0.208 0.708 118 0.028 1.153  27  -1.02 
UN  -0.014 0.070 118 0.000  0.048 27  -1.24 
One Quarter Ahead             
RealGrowth  0.424 2.429 118 -1.706 3.112 27  3.33* 
INF  -0.199 1.066 118 0.333 1.614  27  -1.63 





Greenbook Forecast Errors, 1965IV-2001IV 
ECRI Inflation Cycle 
Variable  Peak to Trough  Trough to Peak 
   Mean  Std Error  Obs Mean  Std Error  Obs 
Value of t-stat: 
Difference of 
means test 
Current Quarter              
INF  -0.294 0.915 57  -0.080 0.727 88  -1.49 
One Quarter Ahead             
INF  -0.499 1.171 57  0.159 1.150 88  -3.33* 




Table 2a Current Quarter Greenbook Forecast Mincer-Zarnowitz Tests 
1965IV - 2001IV (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 Constant    Slope  Wald Test 
Probability 
RealGrowth  0.135 
(0.126) 
1.023 
(0.031)  0.12 
INF  -0.189 
(0.137) 
1.006 
(0.028)  0.05 
UN  0.002 
(0.021) 
0.997 




Table 2b: One Quarter Ahead Greenbook Forecast Mincer-Zarnowitz Tests 
1965IV - 2001IV  (Standard Errors in Parentheses)‡ 
 Constant    Slope  Wald Test 
Probability 
RealGrowth  0.407  
(0.640) 
0.858  
(0.171)  0.64 
INF  -0.003 
(0.251) 
0.977 
(0.069)  0.77 
UN  0.098  
(0.106) 
0.973 
(0.019)  0.04 
‡All one quarter ahead regressions have Newey-West standard errors.  The years 
listed are when the forecasts were made. 
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Table 3a: Current Quarter Greenbook Forecast Ex Post Bias Tests 
1965IV - 2001IV (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 






RealGrowth   0.295  0.990  -0.411  
   (0.183)  (0.042) (0.339)   
0.13 
INF  (1) -0.176  0.992  0.258   
   (0.137)  (0.029) (0.186)   
0.05 
  (2) -0.326  1.007    0.216 
   (0.162)  (0.027)   (0.138) 
0.04 
UN   0.001  0.997  0.016   




Table 3b: One Quarter Ahead Greenbook Forecast Ex Post Bias Tests 
1965IV - 2001IV  (Standard Errors in Parentheses)‡ 






RealGrowth   1.952  (0.543) -3.781  
   (0.597)  (0.162) (0.586)     
<0.01 
INF  (1) 0.029  0.941  0.652   
   (0.229)  (0.057) (0.424)   
0.20 
  (2) -0.474  0.995    0.655 
   (0.311)  (0.067)     (0.224) 
<0.01 
UN   0.082  0.969  0.192   
   (0.096)  (0.017) (0.079)     
<0.01 
‡All one quarter ahead regressions have Newey-West standard errors.  The years 





Bias Tests for Forecast Revisions 1966I - 2001IV (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
    Constant   NBER Dummy  Inflation Dummy  
RealGrowth   0.127  -1.735**   
   (0.185)  (0.428)   
INF  (1) 0.017  0.289   
   (0.083)  (0.192)   
  (2) -0.205    0.457** 
   (0.116)    (0.149) 
UN   -0.085**  0.167**   
   (0.027)  (0.063)   





Bias Tests for Forecast Revisions 1966I - 2001IV (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
   Constant    Lagged  
NBER Dummy 
Lagged  
Inflation Dummy  
RealGrowth   0.088  -1.589**   
   (0.187)  (0.439)   
INF  (1) 0.041  0.172   
   (0.083)  (0.196)   
  (2) -0.194    0.439** 
   (0.116)    (0.150) 
UN   -0.088**  0.188**   
   (0.027)  (0.063)   
**Significant at the 1% level. 
  